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Assessing the Computer Network Operations Threat of 
Foreign Countries 
 
Dorothy E. Denning 
 
As the introduction to this book so aptly stated, advances in information technologies 
simultaneously empower and imperil those who use them. They empower by facilitating 
communications and the flow of information; they emperil by introducing new vulnerabilities 
and targets of attack. Information strategy has to adapt to both of these effects, exploiting and 
leveraging the enabling technologies while protecting against threats to the very same 
technologies we come to rely upon. 
 
In this chapter I address the latter — the defensive side of information strategy as it applies to 
computer and networking technologies. Computer networks have become the target of an ever 
increasing number of hackers, criminals, spies, and others who have found advantage in 
exploiting and damaging them. These actors penetrate computer networks in order to steal, 
degrade, and destroy information and information systems. They launch computer viruses and 
worms, conduct denial-of-service attacks, vandalize websites, and extort money from victims. 
The effects have been costly: businesses disrupted or closed, military systems disabled, 
emergency and banking services suspended, transportation delayed, military and trade secrets 
compromised, and identity theft and credit card fraud perpetrated around the globe. The potential 
consequences of cyber attacks will only get worse as our use of and reliance on information 
technologies increase. 
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 Many government officials and security experts believe that foreign governments pose the 
largest threat to computer networks, followed by terrorists. Of especial concern is a possible 
“electronic Pearl Harbor” or act of cyber terrorism that would affect a critical infrastructure such 
as the power grid or banking network, with devastating economic, social, or national security 
consequences. An attack against military networks could potentially undermine the armed 
forces’ ability to effectively fight an adversary, especially during a time of conflict, and even 
attacks against civilian infrastructures, such as energy and telecommunications, could severely 
damage military capability because of widespread dependence on civilian systems. 
 
So far, the number of reported cyber attacks attributed to foreign governments or terrorists has 
been relatively small, and none have been devastating. Cyber incidents attributed to governments 
have mostly involved espionage, and network attacks by terrorists and their sympathizers have 
fallen more in the domain of crime and vandalism than terrorism — mainly web defacements, 
denial-of-service attacks, and credit card fraud. In 1999 and early 2000, the Chinese government 
was accused of attacking foreign websites associated with the outlawed group Falun Gong,1 but 
government sabotage of this type against foreign computers appears to be the exception. Today it 
seems more likely that the Chinese government would use its national firewalls to filter out 
objectionable websites than launch attacks against them. However, government exploitation of 
computer networks for intelligence purposes seems highly likely given intelligence exploitation 
of other telecommunications media. 
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The paucity of published information about what terrorists and governments are interested in and 
able to do in cyberspace, coupled with the fact that nothing resembling an electronic Pearl 
Harbor or act of cyber terrorism has occurred, has led many to question whether these threats 
have been overhyped or are even real. Yet, it would be as foolish to dismiss such threats as it 
would be to base policy and plans on speculation and unsubstantiated fear. Instead, we need 
well-grounded assessments of what potential adversaries are motivated to do and capable of 
doing. 
 
We also need sound assessments of vulnerabilities in critical infrastructures and how risks can be 
mitigated. However, these evaluations can be conducted without regard to any particular actor or 
motive. Computer networks need to be protected from damaging attacks regardless of whether 
they originate from a runaway worm, a hacker out to see what’s possible, a greedy crook who 
sees an opportunity for extortion, a former employee seeking revenge, a nation-state, or a 
terrorist. Computer worms alone have brought down emergency 911 services, a train signaling 
system, the safety monitoring system at a nuclear power plant, and ATM networks. Insiders 
determined to cause harm are in a particularly powerful position. In what was perhaps the most 
damaging infrastructure attack, a former contractor, armed with the requisite hardware, software, 
and knowledge, hacked a water treatment system in Australia and caused raw sewage 
overflows.2
 
Arguably, it may be more important to focus on protecting the networks rather than studying 
particular actors. However, there are also benefits to be gained by understanding the motives and 
capabilities of those who might attack them. First, if networks are attacked, we would be in a 
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better position to narrow down likely perpetrators. Second, if we enter into military conflict with 
a particular adversary, we would know what that adversary could and could not do to our 
military networks and critical infrastructures. Third, we may learn of capabilities and methods of 
attack that we had not considered. 
 
In 2003, the Naval Postgraduate School began a study to assess the computer network operations 
(CNO) threat of foreign countries. The objective was to develop a general methodology that 
could be applied to any country and to apply it to specific countries as test cases. For our study, 
we chose Iran and North Korea. Our country results were published in two master’s theses, one 
on Iran3 and one on North Korea.4
 
In our project, we sought to elaborate a comprehensive methodology and were less concerned 
about producing a thorough, definitive assessment of the countries we chose. Indeed, because we 
limited our research to unclassified information available through open sources, we almost 
certainly missed key information about these countries. We did not attempt to determine what 
the intelligence services might know that we did not. 
 
This chapter summarizes the results of our research. The next three sections describe our 
methodology and the results for Iran and North Korea. In the country sections, citations are to 
original sources where verified or found in the process of writing this paper. Otherwise, citations 
are to the theses. I have also added some of my own thoughts, which are presented without 
citation. 
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In the discussion of Iran especially, I have singled out specific individuals and groups who have 
engaged in CNO-related activities to illustrate the capability we found. In so doing, I do not 
mean to imply they are the only ones working in CNO or that they pose any sort of threat — 




The US Department of Defense defines computer network operations (CNO) as comprising three 
types of operations: computer network attack, computer network defense, and related computer 
network exploitation-enabling operations.5 Computer network attack (CNA) refers to operations 
to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, 
or the computers and networks themselves. Computer network exploitation (CNE) consists of 
enabling operations and intelligence collection to gather data from target or adversary computers 
and networks in support of CNA. Computer network defense (CND) consists of defensive 
measures to protect and defend information, computers, and networks from disruption, denial, 
degradation, or destruction. In short, CND refers to operations that protect against adversary 
CNA/E. 
 
Outside the US military, it is common to use the term “attack” to refer to any operation that 
intentionally violates security policies and laws. This includes CNE as well as exploit operations 
conducted for the purpose of intelligence collection, not just to enable CNA. It is also common to 
see the term “security” for “defense” and to include within it protection against adversary 
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intelligence operations as well as information operations that disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy. 
Both sets of terms are used in the discussion below. 
 
Although the CNO threat is derived from attack/exploit operations rather than defense, we 
included the latter in our analysis. It is not possible to build strong defenses without knowledge 
of how systems are attacked, so the presence of a CND capability within a country implies at 
least some CNA/E knowledge. Furthermore, it seems unlikely that any country would develop a 
CNA/E capability if it is unable to defend its own networks from a counterattack, so the apparent 
lack of a CND capability would suggest a corresponding lack of CNA/E capability, assuming no 
information to the contrary. A country with a strong CND capability would be in a much better 
position to build and use a CNA/E capability than one without. 
 
To assess a foreign state’s CNO threat, we looked for indicators of capability and intent to 
conduct CNO. These indicators were based on generic factors that could be applied to any 
country. The factors were grouped into four general categories: 
 
• Information technology industry and infrastructure 
• Academic and research community 
• Government and foreign relations 
• Hacking and cyber attacks 
 
The categories are not entirely disjoint. For example, government-sponsored research on CNO 
falls into the second and third categories, and government-sponsored cyber attacks fall into the 
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third and fourth. In the discussion below, we have generally assigned each type of activity to a 
single category and treated it in that context. 
 
Within each category, we began with an initial set of questions to guide our search for 
information, although we did not limit our collection to those questions. In many cases, we could 
not answer the questions directly but found other information that was useful for our analysis. 
 
All of the information we used was unclassified. Most was acquired through the Internet and 
personal contacts in the United States and countries other than those we studied. A more 
complete picture could be obtained with access to classified information or to persons within the 
countries of study. It was especially difficult to obtain information that originated in North Korea 
owing to the closed nature of the country and its apparent isolation from the Internet. 
 
Most of the material we used was in English. We arranged for translation of a few web pages in 
Farsi that we thought might be useful for the Iranian study, but limited time and resources 
precluded translating more. For the most part, we simply ignored websites and documents that 
were not in English. A comprehensive study that includes more foreign language sources could 
very well turn up evidence we did not find. 
 
We made extensive use of Google searches to find relevant information. These searches led us to 
web pages that we had not found by simply browsing institutional websites. However, we did not 
have time to pursue all search hits or to try an extensive set of search strings, which leaves open 
the possibility that we missed a large amount of useful information. For future study, it would be 
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worthwhile to try to identify a collection of search strings that would likely uncover most of the 
relevant information that can found through open-source searches. 
 
We began our study in October 2003. Two students were assigned to the project, one for Iran and 
one for North Korea. Their objective was to report their results in the form of separate master’s 
theses for a September 2004 graduation. 
 
In March 2004, we were invited by the Institute for Security Technology Studies at Dartmouth 
College to review a draft report of a study whose objectives were very close to our own. At that 
time, we were far enough along with our own work to provide feedback on theirs, and their study 
provided valuable input for our own. Their final report was published in November 2004,6 after 
our study of North Korea was complete but while we were in the middle of our Iranian study. 
The Iranian study was delayed for a year because the student conducting the work had an 
unexpected reassignment of duties. Another student later joined the project to see it through to a 
September 2005 completion. 
 
The Dartmouth group took a somewhat different approach in their analysis. In particular, they 
organized evidence indicative of capability or intent into two categories. Category 1 evidence 
consists of direct links to a foreign cyber warfare capability. It is derived from US government 
reports (which we did not use), foreign official statements, and foreign military and intelligence 
agency research. Category 2 evidence consists of circumstantial links indicating a baseline 
information technology infrastructure necessary to support a cyber warfare operation. The 
Dartmouth country reports are organized around these categories and sources of evidence, 
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whereas ours are organized around the four categories of activity described above. The 
Dartmouth report also covers six countries, including the two we studied. Besides Iran and North 
Korea, they studied China, India, Pakistan, and Russia. 
 
The following subsections describe the four areas of activity we investigated, our rationale for 
looking at these areas, and the type of information we sought. 
 
Information Technology Industry and Infrastructure 
 
Our goal here was to assess a country’s information technology (IT) industry and its information 
infrastructure. In the area of IT, we examined the country’s hardware and software industry, IT 
service companies, access to international IT supply chains, industry partnerships with foreign 
companies, and IT professionals in the country; we paid particular attention to companies that 
provided CNO-related technologies or services. However, other areas of technology are also 
relevant. If a country does not have access to or experience using popular hardware and software 
platforms, such as Microsoft Windows and related products, it will be at a disadvantage in terms 
of developing a capability to attack or defend those systems. Also, many of the skills used in one 
area of IT, such as general knowledge and skills in computer networks, operating systems, and 
programming, are transferable to CNO. 
 
In the area of infrastructure, our main interest was computer networks, especially the Internet and 
intranets, but we also considered the country’s telecommunications and electrical infrastructures, 
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since both support networking. If telecommunications or electricity is inadequate or unreliable, it 
may be difficult to launch a sustained attack against another country. 
 
For computer networks, we considered prevalence, connectivity, capacity, technologies and 
platforms used, presence of Internet service providers (ISPs), and government regulations. We 
reasoned that a country that is well connected through modern technologies and high-speed links 
is in a better position to develop a CNO capability than one that is not, as it can draw on the 
considerable expertise and talent acquired through use of the networks. Internet penetration is 
particularly valuable, because it gives the population access to global CNO resources, such as 
hacking tools and “how to” guides, as well as to international targets to attack. But even a 
country that has promoted a national intranet while stifling or prohibiting Internet use is in a 
better position than one that has little networking of any type. 
 
We also considered the legal and regulatory infrastructure as it pertains to CNO, including 
computer crime laws and their enforcement. A lack of laws in this area could be indicative of 
little hacking activity within the country or against the country’s computer systems, in which 
case one might conclude that the country has little or no CNO capability, offensive or defensive, 
at least outside government. However, an absence of cyber crime laws might also mean that 
more general laws (e.g., governing sabotage and fraud) are considered sufficient for prosecuting 
cyber attacks. 
 
Academic and Research Community 
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For this category, we assessed the extent to which faculty and students engaged in educational 
and research activities that support a CNO capability. We also examined research conducted in 
the public domain by persons outside the academic community. Research areas we examined 
include system and application vulnerabilities, computer crime and network attacks, technologies 
and methods of defense, and CNO policy and legal issues. Within this broad research 
community, we looked for CNO-related publications and projects. We also looked for 
conferences and workshops hosted by members of the community within the country or attended 
by members of the community in other countries. 
 
In the academic community, we focused on higher education. We looked for courses in areas of 
CNO and for faculty and students who were conducting research or publishing papers related to 
CNO. We tried to determine whether any faculty members who were engaged in CNO activity 
had been educated outside their country and whether students studied CNO abroad. Much of our 
information was obtained by searching online for school websites and résumés containing CNO-
related entries. 
 
We also examined general education in IT and the IT skills of students at all levels, including 
primary and secondary school. We were especially interested in whether college students in the 
country participated in the annual ACM International Collegiate Programming Contest,7 and if 
so, how well they did. The ACM programming contest, which traces it roots to a competition at 
Texas A&M University in 1970, has evolved into a multitiered competition involving three-
person student teams from around the world. In 2005, the contest drew 4,109 teams from 1,582 
universities in 71 countries. We reasoned that a country needs talented programmers to develop 
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new or sophisticated cyber attacks, so placing well in the contest would suggest the presence of a 
talent base on which to draw. 
 
Government and Foreign Relations 
 
Here we considered efforts on the part of government agencies to develop a CNO capability. We 
looked for signs that the government was creating one or more CNO units or teams, conducting 
training in CNO, or sponsoring or conducting research on CNO. We also looked for documents 
or statements from official government sources that outlined government policy or doctrine on 
CNO. 
 
We tried to determine whether the government was using the Internet for intelligence collection, 
and if so, whether its tactics went beyond open source collection to hacking into computer 
networks. We reasoned that a government with the ability to penetrate and exploit foreign 
networks for intelligence collection would have a head start on developing a CNO capability, as 
many of the same skills are needed. 
 
We considered a government’s relations with other countries to determine whether it might 
acquire CNO-related resources from another country. Such resources might include information, 
technology, or training in CNO. We also looked for motives and objectives that might lead the 
government to conduct a cyber attack against another country. 
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Hacking and Cyber Attacks 
 
This category focused on actual cyber attacks originating in the study country. We considered 
attacks by all types of actors, from teenage hackers to criminal groups to government agencies. 
(Often, however, it is not possible to determine the source of an attack.) We tried to identify 
nongovernment hacking groups and individual hackers operating from within the country. 
 
We wanted to know what types of attack the country’s hackers conducted and what tools and 
methods they used. We considered all types of attack, including denial-of-service attacks, web 
defacements, launching of viruses and worms, use of Trojan horses and spyware, and so forth. 
We considered cyber operations that acquired sensitive information, including trade secrets, 
personal information such as Social Security or credit card information, and sensitive 
government information. 
 
Although we examined attacks against international targets, we were especially interested in 
cyber attacks against US systems and whether such attacks were politically motivated. Patriotic 
Chinese hackers, for example, attacked US systems after the 1999 US bombing of the Chinese 
embassy in Belgrade during the Kosovo conflict and then again in the wake of the US-China spy 
plane incident in 2001. 
 
We tried to determine how the government responded to hacking by its citizens. We wanted to 
know if specific attacks, particularly those against US systems, were tolerated, encouraged, or 
even supported. We wanted to know if the government hired hackers or otherwise made use of 
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hackers’ expertise or skills. A country with an active hacking community can draw on that 
community to develop its CNO capability; it could recruit them into the military or an agency 
with CNO authority, employ their services as consultants or trainers, or participate in their 
activities, such as conferences and online discussion groups. However, if hackers are hired, there 
is a risk that they will attack the government’s own systems or otherwise engage in illegal or 
inappropriate hacking. A country might also encourage its hackers to participate in a war against 




Jason Patterson and Matthew Smith, both lieutenants in the US Navy, performed our study of 
Iran. They found considerable amounts of information on Iranian websites, particularly sites 
associated with universities, government-sponsored research centers, hacking groups, and 
industry. Although they concentrated their efforts on sites that were in English, they obtained 
translations of a few sites that were in Farsi. They completed their study in September 2005.8 
The following subsections summarize some of their key findings and provide additional 
information and analysis not included in their thesis. 
 
IT Industry and Infrastructure 
 
Iran’s information infrastructure has been undergoing growth and modernization since the first of 
a series of five-year plans adopted by Parliament in 1990. The plan, which aimed to restore the 
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Iranian economy in the wake of the Iran-Iraq war, included requirements for information and 
communications technology.9
 
As of 2003, Iran had about 27 main telephone lines and cellular subscribers per 100 people, 
which represented a 670 percent increase from 1990, when there were only 4 such lines and 
cellular subscribers. However, the numbers are still low compared with, say, the United States, 
which had 117 per 100 population in 2003.10
 
Iran provides access to the global telecommunications network through fiber-optic and satellite 
links. A 721 km segment of the Trans-Asia-Europe Project, the world’s largest overland fiber-
optic system, passes through Iran, transmitting data at 622 megabytes per second. In addition, an 
underwater link transmitting at 140 megabits per second connects Iran to the United Arab 
Emirates. Satellite communications were achieved with Inmarsat land earth stations connected to 
commercial satellites, although Iran is now in the process of creating its own satellite network, to 
include two Russian-supplied Zohreh satellites, five land stations, 135 primary and secondary 
stations, 27 zonal stations, 31 community stations, and 1,374 rural stations.11
 
Iran’s foray into the Internet began in the early 1990s when the Institute for Studies in 
Theoretical Physics and Mathematics joined BITNET through Iran’s membership in the Trans-
European Research and Education Networking Association. As BITNET was absorbed into the 
Internet, the Iranian node developed into a Class C Internet node. By 2000, Iran had over 30 
ISPs.12
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According to the International Telecommunications Union, the proportion of Internet users in 
Iran rose from 1.6 percent in 2001 to 7.2 percent in 2003.13 By December 2005, it was up to 10.8 
percent, or about 7.5 million people.14
 
While promoting the Internet, the Iranian government also censors it. This is done largely under 
the wide-ranging Press Law of 1986. According to a study by the OpenNet Initiative, the 
government blocks access to most pornographic sites and anonymizer tools, a large number of 
sites with gay and lesbian content, some politically sensitive sites, women’s rights sites, and 
certain targeted web logs (blogs).15 The study did not examine whether any hacking sites were 
blocked. ISPs use filtering software developed in the United States to block foreign sites. Sites 
based in Iran may be shut down, suspended, or filtered. Operators and authors are subject to 
pressure and even arrest. 
 
Iran’s hardware and software industries are wanting, hampered by state controls, restrictive trade 
policies, external trade embargoes, contradictory legislation, and a lack of software management 
expertise within the industries themselves. Iran has approximately 200 companies involved in 
software development and 20,000 workers in the software industry.16
 
In the area of CNO, we identified one company, Sharif Secure Ware, that bills itself as a network 
security and consultation company.17 We also found a software development company, Systems 
Group, that formed an alliance with a German security company, Securepoint Security Solution. 
Under an arrangement announced in July 2005, Systems Group will be the exclusive 
representative of Securepoint products and services in Iran. Together the two companies seek to 
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become the leading Iranian security software company. With almost 600 employees and 4,500 
customers, Systems Group claims to be the largest software corporation in Iran.18 That Systems 
Group would team with a German security company suggests that Iran might not have a 
competitive domestic security company, although there could be other reasons behind the 
partnership. 
 
Iran does not have any laws that define or specifically prohibit cyber crimes. There are copyright 
protections for domestically produced software, but the laws are seldom enforced and do not 
apply to imports. Software pirating and hacking both run rampant.19
 
Academic and Research Community 
 
Iranian universities have strong IT programs, including computer science and computer 
engineering. They have been active in the ACM programming contest, and two universities did 
as well as any US schools in the world finals held in Shanghai in April 2005. Teams from 
Amirkabir University of Technology and Sharif University of Technology, both located in 
Tehran, tied for 17th place along with Penn State and the University of Illinois.20 Some 60 teams 
from 41 schools participated in the Tehran regionals leading up to the Asia-Pacific regionals and 
then the world finals. Four of the top ten in the Tehran regionals were from Sharif University of 
Technology.21 Sharif did even better in the 2006 contest, placing 13th, ahead of all US schools 
except the 8th-ranked Massachusetts Institute of Technology.22 These results show that Iranian 
schools are producing the programming talent needed to conduct CNO, even if the skills are 
being employed for other purposes. 
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 We identified several universities engaged in CNO education research. These include Sharif and 
Amirkabir, plus the University of Isfahan and Isfahan University of Technology. 
 
At Sharif University of Technology, we found faculty and students with interests in computer 
security. One professor, Shahram Bakhtiari, has taught courses titled Cryptography and Network 
Security, Computers and Networks Security, and Systems and Networks Security. According to 
the course description for the third, “Students who take this course become familiar with 
methods of attack and the ways to protect systems and networks.” His website includes links to 
class presentations, including one on “Hacking Techniques” and one on “IP Security Flaws.” 
Professor Bakhtiari has also published numerous papers on cryptography in journals and 
conference proceedings. He ran three workshops on information security in Iran: a 1999 
workshop held in conjunction with the Computer Society of Iran’s annual international 
conference, a second 1999 workshop held with the Iranian Conference on Electrical Engineering, 
and a 2001 workshop held with the International Internet and Electronic Cities Conference.23
 
Mohammad Abdollahi Azgomi, a PhD candidate at Sharif, wrote his master’s thesis on network 
security and published papers on firewalls and other security topics.24 Hashem Habibi, a master’s 
student in software engineering working with “a huge number of other people” on network 
security, has links to security and hacking sites on his homepage at Sharif. His website also has 
photos of himself and others associated with the Network Security Center and with “Seclab.”25 
Sauleh S. Etemad, an alumnus of Sharif, taught courses and wrote technical reports on network 
and operating systems security at Iran’s Advanced Information and Communication Technology 
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Center before going on to earn a master’s degree in electrical and computer engineering from 
Michigan State University. At Sharif, he completed his bachelor’s thesis on operating systems 
security.26
 
In late 2005, I received an e-mail from a graduate student at Sharif who was completing a 
master’s thesis on the topic of stream ciphers. His research interests included coding and 
cryptrographic protocols, and he was interested in pursuing a PhD as a member of my group. He 
had already published two conference papers. 
 
Sharif has hosted information security conferences, including the Second Iranian Society of 
Cryptology Conference and the Operating System and Security Conference 2003. In addition, it 
has hosted more general IT-related conferences and a conference on electronic warfare.27
 
Amirkabir University of Technology houses a Data Security Research Laboratory within the 
department of Computer Engineering and Information Technology. The role of the laboratory is 
to help promote “research and innovations on computer, information, and communications 
security” and to help train engineers and scientists in related areas. 
 
Two students affiliated with the lab, Haamed Gheibi and Salman Niksefat, taught a workshop on 
hacking operating systems at a conference held in Tehran in 2004. They also posted information 
about a Microsoft Windows security flaw on a computer security electronic mailing list, Bugtraq, 
in 2003, after unsuccessful attempts to gain the attention of Microsoft. Gheibi represented 
Amirkabir in the 2003 ACM programming contest.28
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 Several faculty members at Amirkabir listed computer security as an area of interest. One 
professor, Mehran Soleiman Fallah, works extensively in the computer security field. His PhD 
thesis was on denial-of-service attacks, and he has published several papers on this topic. He has 
also taught an undergraduate course on network security and three graduate courses on 
information security and network security.29
 
At the University of Isfahan, we found two professors who conduct computer security research: 
Ahmad Baraani-Dastjerdi and Behrouz Tork Ladani. Baraani’s area of research includes 
cryptography, database security, and security in computing.30 Ladani’s includes cryptographic 
protocols, information system security, and network security. In 2005, Ladani also taught 
undergraduate courses on cryptography and network security and on security in computer 
systems. He received his PhD from the University of Tarbiat Modares, Iran, where he wrote his 
thesis on cryptographic protocols.31 This would suggest that faculty at Tarbiat Modares are also 
conducting CNO-related research, which is confirmed in the next paragraph. 
 
Isfahan University of Technology hosted the Third Iranian Society of Cryptology Conference in 
September 2005. The conference covered a broad range of topics in cryptography and computer 
and communications security. Several faculty members at the university served on the 
conference committee, so we can assume that there is some CNO-related research taking place at 
the school. The committee also included representatives from Sharif University of Technology 
(nine people, including Bakhtiari), Amirkabir University of Technology (Fallah), the University 
of Isfahan (two, including Baraani), Tarbiat Modares, and several other schools and research 
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institutions.32 We did not attempt to track down all 34 people on the committee, but the size of 
the committee alone indicates a substantial community of security researchers in Iran, most 
likely numbering at least a hundred or two. That Iran has a Society of Cryptology, which has 
sponsored at least three conferences, is further proof of an active and established security 
research community. 
 
We found several websites in Farsi relating to network security. These included sites for the IR 
Computer Emergency Response Team (www.ircert.com), Iran Security 
(weblog.iransecurity.com), Iran Virus Database (www.irvirus.com), and Hat-Squad Security 
Group (www.hatsquad.com). These sites appear to discuss network vulnerabilities, with the 
objective of promoting better security.33 Hat-Squad offers security risk assessment, training, 
consultancy, incident response, penetration testing, and advisories that describe vulnerabilities 
and exploits. 
 
We did not find any research or discussion on how Iran might employ CNA against its 
adversaries or the need to defend critical infrastructures in Iran from adversary CNA. The focus 
seems to be on security in general and on technology. 
 
Government and Foreign Relations 
 
The Iranian government promotes research and development in IT through several institutions, 
among them the Iran Telecommunications Research Center, the Technology Cooperation Office, 
Guilan Science and Technology Park, and Pardis Technology Park. 
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 The Iran Telecommunications Research Center (ITRC) was formed in 1970 as the research arm 
of the Ministry of Information and Communications Technology. Research is organized into four 
departments: Information Technology, Strategic Management, Networking, and Transmission. 
Network security and security management are part of the center’s research agenda, and one of 
the workshops on information security run by Shahram Bakhtiari of Sharif University of 
Technology was held at ITRC.34
 
ITRC is also involved in standards setting. It is a member of the European Technical Standards 
Institute and has created study groups aligned with the International Telecommunications Union 
study groups. Study group 17 is on security, languages, and telecommunications software.35
 
We found three researchers at the center who had presented papers on network security at 
international meetings. Mehdi Rasti, Davood Sarramy, and Mahmood Khaleghi gave a paper on 
network security assessment at a computer applications conference in Orlando, Florida, in 2004. 
In 2003, Rasti gave a paper on anomaly detection at the same conference in Las Vegas, 
Nevada.36
 
The Technology Cooperation Office (TCO) was founded in 1984 to serve the president of Iran. 
Its mission is to support development and cooperation in advanced technologies, including IT. 
Among the forms of support it offers Iranian institutions are coordinating joint research projects 
and establishing relations with foreign industrial and scientific research centers.37
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Guilan Science and Technology Park was established in 1989 as the Iranian Research 
Organization of Science and Technology. The research center was reorganized as a technology 
park in 2002. One of the focus areas for the park is IT, and several IT companies have offices in 
the park. We did not identify any CNO-specific activity at the park.38
 
Pardis Technology Park (PTP), located 20 km from Tehran, was established in 2001 by TCO in 
order to create an environment for researchers, educators, and companies suitable for developing 
Iran’s high-tech industry.39 PTP’s objectives are to intensify high-tech industry development; 
promote cooperation among industry, academia, and government research centers; create 
synergy between private and state sectors; commercialize know-how and innovations generated 
by research centers; and promote research and development in the private sector. PTP is run by a 
board of directors whose members are designated by TCO and Sharif University of Technology. 
The network security company Sharif Secure Ware is among the 45 companies that have signed 
a contract to purchase land at the park.40
 
We found no evidence that the Iranian government was developing a CNA/E capability against 
its adversaries. However, given Iran’s pursuit of asymmetric warfare capabilities, including 
nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and support for terrorism,41 it is possible that it will pursue, if 
it is not already, a CNA/E capability as well. If so, it might collaborate with North Korea, which 
purportedly has been training cyber warriors for years (discussed below). According to reports, 
Iran has cooperated with North Korea on military technology training and transfer in the past, 
including development of missile systems. Iran has also sent military and intelligence officers to 
North Korea for training in psychological warfare and counterespionage.42
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 Hacking and Cyber Attacks 
 
Iran has numerous hackers and hacking groups, some of which also sell network and security 
services. One such group is IHS Iran Hackers Sabotage. According to their website, the group 
was formed in 2004 “with the aim of showing the world that Iranian hackers have something to 
say in the world wide security [sic].” After “rooting many important servers,” they decided to 
participate in the “vulnerability assessment and exploitation process” and to offer a “highly 
secured hosting service.” Their website offers several original exploitation programs for 
download, each written for Visual C++ and based on vulnerabilities reported by others. The 
group consists of three active members, two of whom say they are university students.43
 
As of October 2005, IHS had defaced over 3,700 websites.44 All of the defacements we 
examined contained political messages. For example, a defacement on 25 July 2005 against the 
US Naval Station Guantánamo’s public website emphasized that Muslims were for peace, not 
terrorism, and that many had been harmed in Israel, Iraq, and Guantánamo.45 On 2 October 2005, 
a defacement of a Novell site proclaimed that Iranians had a right to atomic energy and that “NO 
one can rule us not to use atomic power.”46
 
Another group, the Ashiyane Digital Security Team, which sells web hosting and network and 
security services, has defaced over 2,800 websites. Their website includes tools and tutorials on 
hacking and security, a discussion forum, a link to their web defacements, and a list of over 
3,500 registered users interested in security and hacking.47
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 Assuming most of the registered users are Iranian, which seems likely given that much of the 
website is in Farsi, we can conclude that there are thousands of people in Iran interested in 
network security and hacking. 
 
A defacement of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s website on 11 August 
2005 challenged US policy in the Middle East,48 but most of the Ashiyane defacements we 
examined did not contain a political statement. In one case an attacker who goes by the name 
ActionSpider left his e-mail address and offered to help protect the site from other hackers; in 
another, the attacker offered free help patching the hacked server. 
 
Ashiyane team members boast a wide range of experience in operating systems, programming 
languages, and hacking, including firewall penetration, database and operating system hacking, 
software cracking, and social engineering (conning a victim to perform some task, such as 
disclosing a password). Several members taught fee-based courses on hacking and other topics at 
a vocational school in Tehran.49
 
Among the other Iranian hacking groups we found are Iranian Boys Black Hat, Iran Hackers 
Association, Iran Babol-Hackers Security Team, Crouz Security Team, and Persian Crackers. 
Iranian Boys Black Hat has defaced as many sites as Ashiyane (over 2,800). As far as we could 
tell, none carried political messages. This was also true of defacements by Iran Babol-Hackers 
Security Team (over 400), which some members claim are “just for fun.” 
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Iran formed a Defcon group in February 2004. Defcon groups are local groups associated with 
the annual Defcon meeting, which bills itself as the “largest underground hacking event in the 
world,” drawing thousands of information security experts, hackers, and government officials to 
Las Vegas every summer for talks and hacking contests. The individual groups serve as local 
gathering places for discussions of technology and security. Iran’s Defcon group was based in 
Tehran, but apparently it had ceased to exist by April 2006.50
 
Besides web defacements, we found evidence of other political hacking within Iran. For 
example, the weblog of former vice president Mohammad Ali Abtahi was hacked several times 
after he posted entries about government torture of other bloggers, and the website of former 
presidential candidate Ali Larijani was subjected to a distributed denial-of-service attack. 
Larijani’s campaign committee claimed that his site was hacked by the opposition. Bloggers 
theorized that the government was responsible for the attacks against Abtahi and Larijani, but no 
supporting evidence was provided.51
 
Iranians have also acquired and used software that bypasses the government’s Internet filters. In 
an interview with Shift.com, Oxblood Ruffin, founder of Hacktivismo, reported that their 
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Although less than 11 percent of Iranians were online at the end of 2005, Iran has a sizable 
community of interest and expertise in computer network attack and defense. We estimate that 
there are 100 or more academics working in information security, publishing research papers in 
journals and conference proceedings, hosting and attending conferences, and teaching courses on 
network security topics. Although we could not determine sponsorship for this work, it is 
probably fair to assume that it is at least approved, if not also funded, by the government. 
 
We also estimate that there are thousands of additional hackers and network security specialists. 
Many of them have experience in breaking into websites and conducting other types of attacks. 
Some offer network security products, services, and training. 
 
The Iranian government is actively promoting many areas of IT, including networks, with the 
goal of stimulating economic growth. Although we found government-sponsored research in 
network security taking place within government labs, we did not identify any government 
involvement in cyber attacks or any government effort to develop a CNA/E capability against 
adversary countries. However, should government officials decide to develop such a capability, 
they could draw on the Iranian IT community to put together an attack team. 
 
All of these findings indicate that Iran is concerned about network security and taking steps to 
defend its networks, advance the common body of knowledge in security, and exploit the 
commercial market for network security products and services. It also has its share of hackers, 
including people who deface websites. This is all to be expected in today’s interconnected world, 
which has been attracting an ever increasing body of cyber vandals, crooks, and spies, as well as 
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people devoted to improving computer defense. Any country that would ignore network security 
would do so at its peril. From open sources, we did not find indications that Iran’s efforts in 
network security are motivated by a desire to conduct crippling attacks against the infrastructures 




Our study of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) was conducted by Navy Lt. 
Christopher Brown and completed in September 2004.53 We found very little information 
coming directly from inside North Korea, and most of that was posted on websites belonging to 
the government. Hence, we relied more on second-hand information provided by governments, 
news agencies, and scholars residing in other countries. The following subsections summarize 
some of the key findings. 
 
IT Industry and Infrastructure 
 
North Korea is one of the most disconnected countries in the world. In 2001, it had 1.1 million 
telephone lines,54 which represents less than 5 lines per 100 population, compared with 27 for 
Iran and 117 for South Korea and the United States. North Korea began to develop a cellular 
infrastructure, but in May 2004 the government banned mobile phones in order to limit foreign 
influences. The country owns two satellites, an International Telecommunications Satellite 
(Intelsat) and a Russian satellite, both operating in the region of the Indian Ocean. The French 
provide technical support.55
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 The situation with the Internet appears to be even worse. Although North Korea has a top-level 
domain name (.kp) and two assigned Class C Internet protocol (IP) address blocks with 131,072 
addresses, we found no evidence of any activity originating from these assigned IP addresses or 
the .kp domain.56 A Google search of the .kp domain returned 147 hits on 24 October 2005, but 
none of the websites were accessible, and no content was displayed with the search results, 
unlike most searches, which return two lines of content for each matching website. It is possible 
that the sites are registered but not yet used. Alternatively, the sites may be up but inaccessible 
from the United States or outside North Korea. 
 
We did find North Korean websites hosted in other countries, including China, Japan, and 
Australia. The small handful of official state-sponsored sites we found were located on servers in 
China and Japan.57 The website for the Korean Central News Agency of DPRK, for example, is 
in Japan (at http://www.kcna.co.jp/). 
 
Internet access in North Korea is extremely limited. An Internet café was opened in Pyongyang 
in May 2002, but the rates were reported to be about $10 per hour, more than one-fifth of the 
average North Korean’s monthly earnings. Thus, the café is believed to serve mainly visiting 
businessmen, tourists, and diplomats. Some hotels in Pyongyang also provide Internet access, but 
again for visitors.58 We did not find any information regarding Internet access for the general 
population. Considering the ban on cell phones, it seems likely that Internet access is highly 
restricted, if even available. 
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North Korea has a national intranet. The Kwang Myong (Bright Star) Network runs through 
fiber-optic cable with a backbone capacity of 2.5 gigabytes per second.59 Developed in 1996 with 
the goal of linking various research and academic institutions, the Bright Star Network now also 
includes government and military agencies, as well as public access. By November 2004, several 
PC cafés were open in Pyongyang, providing access to e-mail, internal websites, chat, online 
games, and streaming movies over a 100 megabit-per-second fiber-optic link to the national 
intranet. The largest café, located by a subway station, has around 100 computers.60 A 2001 
report indicated that North Korea had begun testing a firewall between the Bright Star Network 
and the Internet in order to screen and restrict information flows in both directions.61
 
Telecommunications and networking depend on power, and North Korea’s electrical 
infrastructure is both antiquated and unreliable, with frequent power outages and poor frequency 
control. Since reliable and stable power is needed for sustained computer network operations, 
North Korea’s ability to conduct CNA/E against its adversaries is probably limited.62
 
North Korea has developed a personal data assistant (PDA), the Hana-21, based on an original 
Korean operating system. However, much of its IT hardware sector is technologically dated, and 
computers and communications equipment are imported from China and Southeast Asia.63 
Technology exports to North Korea are severely restricted under the Wassenaar Arrangement on 
Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, limiting North 
Korea’s ability to acquire advanced information technologies from signatories of the treaty 
(which includes the United States and South Korea but not China). 
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North Korea’s software industry is closely tied into its research institutions, including the Korean 
Computer Center, the Pyongyang Programming Center, and Kim Il Sung University. Areas of 
focus include voice recognition, language translation, gaming, animation, multimedia, and 
biometrics.64 Except for biometrics, which can be used for network security, these technologies 
are not germane to CNO. 
 
We did not find any laws specifically addressing the Internet, including computer crime laws. 
However, telecommunications are heavily censored, and all international telephone calls are 
facilitated through a state-run exchange operator, which is closely monitored. Until computers, 
telephones, and the Internet become more prevalent, North Korea may not see much need for 
computer crime laws. 
 
Academic and Research Community 
 
North Korean leader Kim Jong Il has said that there are three basic types of fools in the twenty-
first century: people who smoke, people who do not appreciate music, and people who cannot 
use the computer. An avid Internet user, he has stated that IT is the future of North Korea and 
that those who do not educate themselves in it will be left behind. Hence, it is not surprising that 
computer education is mandatory and emphasized, starting in grade school. Computer science 
has topped the list of curriculum choices among young military officers and college students, and 
possessing a computer-related job is considered a sign of privilege. North Korea does not 
participate in the ACM programming contest, but students can submit software they have 
developed to a government-sponsored national programming contest.65
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 We found three major academic institutions in North Korea actively involved in IT: Pyongyang 
University of Computer Technology, Kim Chaek University of Technology (KUT), and Kim Il 
Sung University. Faculty at Kim Il Sung University have developed security-related software 
products, including Worluf Anti-Virus and Intelligent Locker.66
 
In 2001, KUT and Syracuse University began discussions on the possibility of research 
collaboration in integrated information technology. By June 2004, KUT representatives had 
made three visits to Syracuse, and the Syracuse team had made one trip to North Korea. The 
general area of collaboration is systems assurance, in particular technology to foster trusted 
communications. Although “trusted communications” is often linked with cryptography and 
network security, the group seems to be concerned more with integrity, safety, and reliability 
than network defense. The current focus has been on using open-source software to produce a 
back-end library management system for the KUT digital library. The group has produced 
designs for twin research labs, software specifications, joint work on proving software 
correctness, research presentations, and an academic paper.67
 
Government and Foreign Relations 
 
North Korea has seven research institutions focused on IT. The most prominent are the 
Pyongyang Informatics Center, the Korea Computer Center, the DPRK Academy of Sciences, 
and Silver Star Laboratories. 
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The Pyongyang Informatics Center (PIC) was established in 1986 to develop computer-based 
management techniques and to help promote the use of computers in government and industry. 
Its primary focus is software development, and PIC has produced a variety of products, including 
the software filters used between the Bright Star Network and the Internet, which serve a role in 
computer network defense as well as censorship. However, most of PIC’s development work 
seems to be in areas unrelated to CNO, including electronic publication, computer-aided design, 
embedded Linux, web applications, interactive programs, accounting, and virtual reality. This 
assessment is supported by a report that in 2001, researchers at PIC requested 250 IT books from 
South Korea; they were especially interested in books on graphics and virtual animation but also 
on common operating systems and communication methods. The list did not include any books 
relating to cyber security.68
 
The Korea Computer Center (KCC) was established in 1990 to promote computerization. With 
800 employees at its inception, it has produced some of North Korea’s cutting-edge software, 
including systems for voice recognition, fingerprint identification, and artificial intelligence. It 
has produced a Korean version of the Linux operating system, and its chess playing software has 
dominated Japan’s annual Chinese chess competition.69
 
The KCC is directed by Kim Jong Nam, the son of Kim Jong Il. Nam, who also heads the State 
Security Agency (SSA), which is North Korea’s intelligence service, moved SSA’s overseas 
intelligence unit into the KCC, according to a South Korean newspaper. South Korean media 
have also claimed that the KCC is “nothing less than the command center for Pyongyang’s cyber 
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warfare industry, masquerading as an innocuous, computer geek–filled software-research 
facility.”70
 
The DPRK Academy of Sciences and Silver Star Laboratories are also involved in software 
development. Between them, they have produced software for language translation, optical 
character recognition, artificial intelligence, multimedia, remote control, and communications. 
We did not find any indications that either institute had developed CNO-related software.71
 
In 1984, North Korea established the Mirim Academy, which offered a two-year program in IT 
and electronic warfare for top military students. Two years later, the school became a five-year 
college, Mirim College, and opened admissions to high school students from the top percentile. 
The school, also known as the Automated Warfare Institute, purportedly offers curricula in 
command automation, computers, programming, automated reconnaissance, and electronic 
warfare.72
 
According to a June 2003 news report, Maj. Gen. Song Young-keun, commanding general of 
South Korea’s Defense Security Command, said that North Korea has been producing 100 cyber 
soldiers annually.73 In May 2004, at a conference in Seoul organized by the Korea Information 
Security Agency (KISA), Song said that “Following orders from Chairman Kim Jong Il, North 
Korea has been operating a crack unit specializing in computer hacking and strengthening its 
cyber-terror ability.” He said that the hackers were handpicked from among the top graduates of 
Kim Il Sung Military Academy and given intensive training in computer-related skills before 
being assigned to the hacker’s unit.74 According to East-Asia-Intel.com, which provides news on 
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the Far East, Mirim College was renamed Kim Il Military Academy and later Pyongyang 
College. The news site also reported that Byun Jae-Jeong, a research fellow at the South Korea 
Agency for Defense Development, claimed that the cyber agents had a technical ability on a par 
with that of CIA hackers and that they were able to “infiltrate and gather information from Web 
servers from various countries.”75
 
Developing a CNA/E capability is certainly consistent with Kim Jong Il’s interest in IT and his 
military objectives — to “disturb the coherence of South Korean defenses in depth including its 
key command, control, and communications, and intelligence infrastructure.”76 Moreover, 
Richard Clarke, former special adviser to the president for cyberspace security, reported that 
North Korea was “developing information warfare units, either in their military, or in their 
intelligence services, or both.”77
 
Hacking and Cyber Attacks 
 
At the 2004 conference in Seoul, Maj. Gen. Song Young-keun claimed that North Korea’s 
military hackers had been breaking into the computer networks of South Korean government 
agencies and research institutes to steal classified information.78 We also found reports of other 
cyber attacks being attributed to North Korean hackers. However, Director Baek, of South 
Korea’s National Intelligence Service (NIS), told us in a telephone interview in April 2004 that 
NIS had no knowledge of confirmed CNA/E activities originating from within North Korea, or 
of North Korea sponsoring CNA/E against any country. This view was echoed by officials at 
KISA.79
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 We found no evidence that North Korea has hackers operating outside the government. Given 
the severe restrictions on Internet use within the country, any hacking being conducted from 
North Korea would most likely be government sponsored. Within the government, hacking 





North Korea most likely has a CNO capability within its military and intelligence services. It 
appears to recognize the value of IT and CNO to its future and to have devoted resources to 
training and supporting cyber warfare units. 
 
Whether North Korea’s CNO capability has been used to attack targets in South Korea, the 
United States, or elsewhere is less certain. The capability may be used primarily for defensive 
purposes or for intelligence collection against foreign governments and businesses. However, if 
North Korean hackers are able to stealthily penetrate or exploit computer networks in order to 
acquire secrets, they could as well use their skills to damage or disrupt these networks. 
 
North Korea faces several obstacles to developing and deploying an advanced CNO capability. 
Its highly restricted Internet connectivity and unreliable and antiquated electrical infrastructure 
could interfere with the conduct of attacks, especially sustained attacks. Trade restrictions make 
it difficult for the country to acquire the latest hardware and software platforms, which in turn 
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hampers its ability to develop and test attacks against these systems. Restrictions on Internet 
access would make it hard for North Korea to acquire hacking tools and information from the 
Internet, and to use or build on the work of tens of thousands of others in the world. Because 
much of the North Korea’s IT research and development effort is in areas unrelated to CNO, the 
country’s own academic and public communities would have little to offer in the way of CNO 
expertise. Internet restrictions would also preclude North Korean youth from getting involved in 
the Internet hacking scene and building up knowledge and skills that could later be channeled 
into government-sponsored activity. CNO agents would have to be trained from scratch. 
 
While these hurdles do not imply that North Korea could not develop a powerful CNO 
capability, they suggest that a certain amount of skepticism may be appropriate when assessing 







Our study concluded that both Iran and North Korea have a CNO capability. However, whereas 
the capability we identified for Iran lies within its academic and research communities and the 
general population, North Korea’s lies mainly within its military. 
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We did not find evidence that either country had a highly sophisticated capability that would 
even come close to matching that in many other countries, including Australia, China, Russia, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States. Both countries, but especially North Korea, operate 
at a disadvantage because of trade restrictions prohibiting exports of advanced Western 
technologies to them. North Korea’s disadvantage is compounded by its extreme isolation, not 
just from the Internet but from most of the world. Iran is plugged into the Internet and the 
international business, security, and hacking communities and thus can better leverage 
technologies and knowledge developed outside its borders. Moreover, the Iranian government 
can build on the knowledge and skills of its own population as participants in these international 
communities. North Korea is confined to whatever CNO capability it can develop in-house, 
behind government doors. 
 
There are several limitations to our study. First, and perhaps most important, it is difficult and 
risky to draw conclusions based on a lack of evidence. It could be that both countries have highly 
advanced CNO capabilities, and that we just did not look hard enough or in the right places. As 
noted earlier, we did not have access to government officials in either country, and we did not 
use classified information from our own intelligence services, which no doubt limited what we 
could learn, especially about military capabilities. Our limited resources — we could not conduct 
every possible Internet and library search, follow every link, and translate every foreign website 
and document — also limited our data collection. 
 
Another limitation is that our assessment is mainly qualitative. We attempted to measure a few 
factors, including the number of security researchers and hackers in a country, the percentage of 
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the population with Internet access, and the size of the security industry, but we did not 
formulate specific metrics that would allow one to rate a country’s CNO capability on, say, a 
scale from 0 to 10. That said, I might rate Iran at 2 or 3 and North Korea at 1. I would rate Iran 
higher if we had evidence of a strong CNO capability within its military. 
 
A third limitation is that our research and assessments were inherently subjective, biased by our 
own preferences and beliefs. These included beliefs that it would be difficult to develop a strong 
CNO capability in isolation and that a CNO capability within a country’s population could be 
leveraged by a government to develop or strengthen its own. 
 
These limitations present an opportunity for future research. Currently, however, we have shifted 
our focus to the terrorist threat. We have developed a methodology to assess the CNO threat of 
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